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Abstract: This article focuses on the provision and financing of aged care in Australia. Demand 
for aged care will increase substantially as a result of population aging, with the number of 
Australians aged 85 and over projected to increase from 400,000 in 2010 to over 1.8 million 
in 2051. Meeting this demand will greatly strain the current system, and makes it important to 
exploit opportunities for increased efficiency. A move to greater beneficiary co-payments is 
also likely, though its extent may depend on whether aged care insurance and other forms of 
pre-payment can develop.
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The demand for and supply of aged care
On current demographic projections, the number of Australians aged 85 and over 
will increase from 380,000 in 2009,1 to 500,000 in 2020, and then to over 1.8 million 
in 2050.2 Underlying this trend are changes in life expectancy at the conventional 
retirement age of 65. In 1983, life expectancy at age 65 stood at 14 years for men and 
18 years for women; by 2001–2003, it had increased to 18 years for men and 21 years 
for women; it is expected to have increased further to 21 years for men and close to 
24 years for women by 2021. Reflecting this increase in life expectancy post age 65, 
the number of the very elderly is expected to rise especially sharply, in the context 
of a population which, as a whole, is becoming more concentrated in the older age 
brackets.
As that process occurs, the challenge of providing long-term care of and to the 
elderly will become of increasing importance. “Long-term care” refers to care provided 
for the treatment of chronic conditions, where the emphasis is on “care” rather than 
“cure”. While long-term care is required for many disabilities, the focus here is on 
the management of those chronic conditions associated with aging. In Australia, this 
is generally referred to as “aged care”.
Two facts are central to this challenge. The first is that older cohorts are living 
longer than ever before, with a corresponding rise in the numbers expected to live 
beyond the age of 70 and hence to be at material risk of requiring care.3 The second 
is that younger cohorts are having fewer children, which among other things, means 
they will have fewer voluntary caregivers to draw on when they reach old age. These 
trends alone – the sheer increase in the numbers of the very old, especially relative 
to the potential population of caregivers – make large and sustained increases in the 
demand for aged care inevitable.
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However, the impacts on the structure of demand for care 
are also important, though more complex. At the moment, 
long-term care is provided in three forms which broadly 
correspond to differing levels of acuity: domiciliary care 
(also known as community care), which mainly responds to 
situations where the need for care is relatively limited; low-
level residential care, also referred to as care in a hostel; and 
finally, high-level residential or nursing-home care, which 
addresses cases where a high level of ongoing nursing care 
is required. Residential care has historically accounted for 
the bulk of (public and private) aged care outlays (82% in 
2006–2007), with “high-level care” in turn accounting for 
68% of residential care days and 78% of public and private 
outlays on residential care in 2006–2007.
Around 800,000 older people received aged care services 
in Australia in 2006–2007.4 The majority of these, over half a 
million people, received quite low intensity levels of support 
in the community through the Home and Community Care 
(HACC) Program, which is jointly funded by the Common-
wealth and the states and territories. In general, these services 
(for example, meals on wheels, domestic assistance, and 
home nursing) are delivered as individual interventions by 
organizations that are block funded. Average expenditure on 
HACC clients is about AU$1600 per client per year.
Some 55,500 people received packages of subsidized com-
munity care through the Commonwealth’s Community Aged 
Care Package Program and its Extended Aged Care at Home 
(EACH) Program. These services differ from those provided 
under the HACC program, as they are delivered as packages 
of care, usually involving case management.  Community 
Aged Care Packages deliver a level of care equivalent to that 
provided in low-level residential care at an estimated average 
annual (total public and private) cost of AU$14,200. Extended 
Aged Care at Home packages deliver a level of care equivalent 
to that provided in high-level residential care at an estimated 
average annual cost of AU$41,700.
A further 202,500 people received subsidized permanent 
residential aged care at some stage during 2006–2007, with an 
average of around 157,000 people receiving care each night. 
The estimated average annual (total public and private) costs 
of high-level and low-level residential care per recipient were 
AU$62,200 and AU$36,300 respectively.
Community care, low-level residential care and high-level 
residential care define a notional continuum in which care 
recipients move, as their ability to cope with the activities of 
daily living diminishes, from limited domiciliary care to low-
level residential care and then on (though often for very short 
periods of time) to high-level residential care. Not all care 
recipients transverse the continuum. In 2004–2005, about 
half of all discharges from Community Aged Care Packages 
were to residential aged care, with about 20% of discharges 
due to death. For care recipients who were discharged from 
the Extended Aged Care at Home Program, some 43% 
entered residential aged care with 36% of discharges being 
due to death. On the other hand, in 2002–2003, fewer than 
10% of permanent admissions to residential aged care were 
of people who had received care through Community Aged 
Care Packages in the previous 90 days, although this share 
is likely to increase as the number of Community Aged Care 
Packages increases relative to the number of residential aged 
care places. About one-third of people with an admission 
into permanent residential aged care in 2002–2003 had used 
HACC services in the previous 80 days.5 This progression 
reflects the underlying economics of care provision: domicili-
ary care allows care recipients to retain the comfort of their 
own home, but imposes transport costs on non-co-resident 
caregivers and foregoes scale and scope economies in the 
supply of care; in contrast, residential care secures economies 
in specialized infrastructure (including accommodation that 
is purpose-designed in terms of mobility and safety) and in 
the use of specialized resources (such as nursing staff), but 
at the cost of standardized accommodation arrangements and 
loss of close contact with the external community. As higher 
levels of disability require ever more use of the specialized 
inputs, relative to more general inputs such as conventional 
accommodation, it is generally cost-effective to provide the 
more intense levels of care in a specialized residential care 
environment.
Whether movement along this continuum will remain, 
the modal pattern is, however, questionable. Two, somewhat 
conflicting, factors are at work.
On the one hand, smaller differences in life expectancy 
between men and women may reduce the demand for resi-
dential care as they translate into fewer years of  widowhood – 
since loss of a family caregiver often precipitates a need 
for residential care. The impact of differential mortality on 
demand for long-term care is examined in Lakdawalla and 
Philipson (2002) and Lakdawalla and Schoeni (2003).6,7 This 
effect, which is partially offset by the increase in the number 
of persons who have never married or who are divorced or 
separated, may be accentuated by improved health among 
the “younger elderly”, as well as by the likely strong aver-
sion of the “baby boomers” to institutionalized living and 
institutional forms of care.8
On the other hand, the growth in numbers in the very 
elderly age brackets is likely to be associated with increased 
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numbers of sufferers from dementia, extreme fragility, and 
other serious impairments to the capacity to perform daily 
living activities, all of which usually require some form 
of intensive residential care. The prevalence of dementia, 
for example, appears to double every 5 years after age 65. 
As a result, if current age-specific dementia rates remain 
unchanged, the prevalence of dementia will double by 2030.9 
More generally, while there will be a significant increase in 
the average number of years a person lives in the age brackets 
65 and above, it will continue to be the case that aging will 
bring with it senescence and, consequently, molecular and 
cellular pathogenesis that degrades the functional integrity 
and homeostasis of the body.10,11 These normal processes of 
pathogenesis will be accentuated by the rising population 
incidence of chronic conditions such as obesity, which appear 
more likely to give rise to increased morbidity in the older 
population than to increased mortality.12 Especially in the 
“older old”, these factors will translate into a requirement 
for substantial, ongoing, and continuous assistance, usually 
involving residential care.
The overall result seems likely to create a growing need 
for two types of care provision.
The first is care that is provided in a person’s home, 
including in congregated living arrangements – such as “life 
care” communities – that seek to integrate home and care. 
This type of care, which corresponds to the various forms 
of community care, should suffice for the growing numbers 
who have a reasonable, even if incomplete, ability to carry 
out basic daily activities, especially in circumstances where 
they also have spousal or family assistance. The strong prefer-
ence of the “baby boom” generation for independent living 
is likely to make this kind of domiciliary care the option of 
choice for large sections of the aged population.
The second is care in residential facilities that provide for 
those who have little or very little ability to undertake basic 
daily living activities, and who need a high level of close 
support – as in current “high care”. Demand for this kind 
of care (and for high-level care at home with a collocated 
informal caregiver) will rise as we experience a continued 
increase in the incidence of those chronic conditions – such 
as Alzheimer’s disease, severe arthritis, and serious visual 
and hearing impairment – that greatly reduce, if they do not 
eliminate, the ability to live without continuous assistance.
Conversely, demand for low-level care, which is inter-
mediate between home care and ongoing close support, may 
well decline as a proportion of total long-term care as the 
“baby boom” generations come into old age. Low-level care 
facilities will, of course, remain of importance, if  nothing else 
because the sheer scale of the increase in the older popula-
tion will ensure continued substantial demand for residential 
facilities oriented to low, but not insignificant, levels of 
disability. Moreover, the demand for intermittent residen-
tial care services, again oriented to relatively low levels of 
disability, is also likely to increase, probably substantially. 
This kind of care will in many instances be provided in a 
low-level care setting. But while these factors will ensure 
that low-level residential care remains significant in absolute 
terms, its weight in the overall structure of care provision 
seems set to diminish.
As a result, demand for care is likely to shift from being a 
continuum that moves from home, into low-level residential 
care and then (often for only a short time) into high-level 
residential care, towards a pattern concentrated at the two 
ends of the spectrum.
At the same time, the temporal structure of care – ie, the 
distribution of durations of care in the recipient  population – is 
likely to change.
Thus, long durations are likely to become more common 
in high-level care, as that care becomes less of an immedi-
ate antecedent to death. Already, at all levels of frailty, 
residents with dementia remain in residential care longer 
than other residents.13 In part, reflecting the rising incidence 
of dementia, over the 4 years, the proportion of discharges 
from permanent residential care that were in care for at least 
2 years after admission rose by 1.9 percentage points (from 
38.6% to 40.5%).
However, short stays will also remain common, and may 
become more so, both because of the greater prevalence of 
intermittent care and because many admissions continue to 
be as a result of acute events. In the last 3 months of 2006, 
for example, 10.9% of discharges from high-level residential 
care occurred less than 1 month after admission, and 12.2% 
of discharges occurred between 1 and 3 months after admis-
sion, with 70.0% and 69.8%, respectively, of these discharges 
being due to death.
As a result, the distribution of durations of residential 
care, which already is bimodal,14 may become even more 
so, with a bunching of durations at the relatively short and 
relatively long ends of the duration spectrum.
These changes in the level, structure, and duration of 
demand will impose a significant adjustment burden on 
the aged care sector. The total supply of care will need to 
increase, with large absolute rises being required in the level 
of provision in each part of the aged care spectrum. For 
example, for current ratios of places available to the aged 
population to be met in, say 2025, an absolute increase of 
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83,100 places would be required in low care (as compared 
with a total number of low-care places of 86,000 today), 
with the corresponding increase in high care being of 87,400 
places (as compared with a total number of high-care places 
of 81,700 today). At the same time, the structure of sup-
ply will need to shift, with larger increases in community 
care on the one hand, and high-level residential care on 
the other.
Supply-side adjustments will also be impelled by changes 
in the costs of the different types of aged care.
Community care often relies upon the presence of a co-
resident informal caregiver. When assessed by aged care 
assessment teams (ACATs), older people living alone are 
more likely to be recommended for residential care than those 
living with a spouse or other informal caregiver. There is 
also evidence that older people who have access to informal 
care can remain living in the community for longer and enter 
residential care at a higher level of frailty.15–17 Here, some-
what offsetting factors seem likely to operate. On the one 
hand, a diminished gap in life expectancy between men and 
women is likely to reduce the number of years of widowhood, 
effectively increasing the supply of co-resident care. On the 
other hand, the increased numbers who have never married, 
or who are divorced or separated, will at least partially offset 
that increase in supply. Additionally, the greater scarcity of 
working age people in the future population will increase the 
opportunity cost of the choice to engage in informal caring, 
reducing the supply of informal care services. Finally, low 
birth rates in recent decades mean that the average older 
person will have fewer children from whom informal care 
can be sought. As a result, and on balance, the supply of 
informal care is likely to diminish relative to the size of the 
older population.
Given that demand for community care is likely to 
increase strongly, reduced supply of informal caregivers 
could impose substantial costs on the community care sector. 
Already the opportunity cost of informal care, measured as 
the reduction in paid employment due to caring, is estimated 
to be about 0.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) – that is, 
about 9.9% of the contribution to GDP (gross value added) 
of formal health care. The cost of replacing the work done 
by informal caregivers, where their services are no longer 
available, is of course much higher. It has been estimated 
that if all hours of informal care were replaced with services 
purchased from formal care providers and provided in the 
home, the replacement value would be about 3.5% of GDP 
(ie, about 62.2% of the contribution to GDP of other formal 
health care).18,19
The resulting difficulties will be made all the more acute 
by the fact that the supply of the formal aged care workforce 
will also face considerable pressure as the share of the popu-
lation requiring care increases.20 In effect, population aging 
seems likely to create an increased demand for hospital care, 
with here too, the sheer weight of the numbers moving into 
the higher age brackets more than offsetting possible reduc-
tions in the number of annual hospital bed-days required 
for each person in each age class.21 The resulting growth in 
total hospital bed-days will require a corresponding increase 
in the medical labor force, forcing the aged care sector to 
compete for nurses and other specialized labor inputs in a 
tight labor market.
Significant innovations in the way in which services are 
delivered will be needed if these structural pressures are to be 
dealt with efficiently. These innovations will affect both the 
venues in which care services are provided – with forms of 
congregated, but not institutional, living likely to be impor-
tant in reconciling the need for care with the baby boomers’ 
demands for independent living – and the manner of service 
delivery (for example, in terms of the use of information tech-
nology). Widespread diffusion of these innovations will need 
to be accompanied by shifts in the composition of supply, 
and most notably, by a reweighting of supply towards care 
in the community on the one hand, and the more intensive 
forms of “high-level care” on the other.
Whether the aged-care sector will have the flexibility 
required to effect these changes remains to be seen. Aged 
care in Australia developed, initially, primarily through the 
charitable sector, and to this day, charitable and nonprofit 
organizations (and state and local governments) account for 
some 68% of residential places and 95% of community care 
packages. While there are many respects in which supply by 
charitable and nonprofit organizations can be highly socially 
efficient, there is also evidence that those organizations find 
it more difficult to undertake supply adjustments.22 It may 
well be, for example, that their willingness to retrench in a 
timely way is reduced by the absence of a profit constraint, 
while their ability to expand is constrained by limited access 
to equity funding.23
In short, demographic, social, and economic pressures 
will impose a large and continuing adjustment burden on the 
aged-care sector. While the absolute scale of service provi-
sion will need to increase sharply, the nature and composition 
of supply will also need to change, and far-reaching innova-
tions will be required if community expectations are to be 
met. The preponderance of nonprofit institutions in current 
supply may hinder the sector’s ability to respond to these 
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challenges. But, however great the rigidities associated with 
nonprofit supply may be, they are likely to be small compared 
with those that can arise from regulation. It is to a consider-
ation of regulation and its effects that we now turn.
The role of government
In an ideal market economy, the role of public policy in 
aged-care provision would be limited to putting in place a 
framework where market forces could provide individuals 
with care choices that matched their needs, while ensuring an 
effective safety net for those with little ability to pay. Given 
the frail condition of many beneficiaries, and the difficulties 
involved in relying on market forces alone to regulate service 
quality in an activity where consumers are poorly placed to 
exercise either “voice” or “exit”, such a framework would 
likely involve a relatively high degree of service quality 
regulation and other measures to address information asym-
metries. Subject to the constraints imposed by that regulation, 
competition between providers would ensure that the industry 
adjusted to changing needs, including in terms of the balance 
between different types and levels of care.
In practice, however, the government role in Australia 
goes well beyond this. As matters currently stand,  Australian 
governments – and the Commonwealth Government in 
 particular – bear the primary burden of funding residential 
aged care, even where care recipients are capable of meeting 
those costs. The Commonwealth also funds community care, 
which provides care in the home, but shares that respon-
sibility with the states and territories). Additionally, the 
Commonwealth extensively regulates care provision. That 
regulation extends not only to ensuring service quality but 
also to controlling the number, composition, and location 
of the places made available. More specifically, the Com-
monwealth uses “planning ratios” that specify the number of 
aged care places that are to be made available as a function 
of the population aged 70 and over. Access to these places 
is controlled through a process of needs assessment, based 
on medical evaluations of disability that grade potential 
beneficiaries in terms of the degree of care that they require. 
This assessment is currently done by ACATs, which are 
funded by the Commonwealth but managed by the states and 
territories. Through these controls over numbers, the Com-
monwealth rations the use of the service, thus controlling its 
fiscal exposure. The Commonwealth also regulates the prices 
that aged-care providers can levy on their residents. While the 
costs incurred by about a third of residents are entirely borne 
by the Commonwealth (other than the basic daily fee of 85% 
of the age pension which is arguably a transfer payment by the 
Commonwealth), the vast majority of residents pay some part 
of the charges associated with these regulated prices, with the 
extent of this co-payment depending on income and assets 
tests. A notable feature of these tests is their exclusion from 
the asset base of the family home. In general, residents pay a 
basic daily fee (85% of the basic age pension), an asset-tested 
contribution towards the capital cost of their accommodation 
(accommodation bonds and charges) and an income-tested 
contribution to the cost of their care. Capital contributions 
had been a feature of the hostel funding arrangements since 
their very beginning, and a degree of asset testing was first 
introduced into those arrangements in 1987. Capital contri-
butions were extended to nursing homes in 1997, and at the 
same time an asset-tested Commonwealth contribution (the 
concessional resident supplement) was introduced for those 
unable to make a personal capital contribution. Income tested 
care contributions were also introduced in 1997.24
Much of the complexity of these arrangements arises from 
the position of aged care at the nexus of health and social 
welfare policy, and from the complex development of those 
two policy streams in Australian history.24 When introducing 
the Invalid and Old-age Pensions Act 1908 into the Common-
wealth Parliament, the then Treasurer, John Forrest, stated 
that, “No one is to receive an old-age pension unless he is 
unable to maintain himself ”.25 This principle, which gives 
a primary role to means-testing, still largely guides income 
support arrangements. Thus, the maximum rate of the pension 
is set at a level that encourages self-provision. Self-provision 
is further encouraged and rewarded through the concessional 
taxation treatment afforded to superannuation and through 
the tapered income and assets means test.
In contrast, the health policy of successive Common-
wealth governments has been chiefly inspired by the principle 
that access to publicly funded essential health care services 
should be irrespective of means. However, unlike social 
welfare policy, where means tests would be applied to ensure 
that the cost of care remained affordable for individuals who 
could not meet the full costs of their own care, health policy 
has sought to give individuals a sense of personal and social 
responsibility through the use of co-payments. In some cases, 
such as the Medical Benefits Schedule and private health 
insurance, the co-payment is unregulated, while in others, 
such as the Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule, it is regulated. 
In the case of public hospitals, the co-payment is temporal 
(waiting time), rather than monetary. Counterbalancing the 
principle of universal access to tax-payer subsidized care, 
moreover, has always been the need to ensure that the cost 
of care should also be affordable to the Commonwealth 
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(and in respect of public hospitals, the states and territories). 
Reflecting that need, access to assistance is subject to a 
clinical necessity requirement and, additionally, to quantity 
rationing.
Commonwealth involvement in the funding of aged care 
arose at the intersection of the pension (and more generally, 
income support) and health care systems. From the former, 
it inherited an emphasis on means testing. From the latter 
came an emphasis on universality of access, tempered 
by quantity rationing (enforced through the restrictions 
on the number of places) and by reliance on significant 
co-payments.
The consequences of this mixed approach have been 
extensively discussed in Professor Hogan’s Review of Pricing 
Arrangements in Residential Aged Care (April 2004) and the 
basic economics of the situation have not altered materially 
since the time of Professor Hogan’s review.26
Recent reforms, introduced in response to Professor 
Hogan’s report, will significantly increase the overall level 
of supply of subsidized aged care places, better target the 
income and asset testing arrangements and improve the 
financing arrangements for high-level residential care.27 
However, they do not alter the underlying rationing system 
that determines the supply of places. That rationing of places, 
while it does manage the Commonwealth’s fiscal risk, creates 
an artificial scarcity that limits the scope for competition, 
blunts pressures for efficiency and innovation and deprives 
consumers of choice.
Thus, since the turn of this century, occupancy levels 
in residential care facilities have been in excess of 90% for 
low care and of 95% for high care, and though they have 
recently declined slightly (most probably as a temporary 
artifact of the construction of a significant number of new 
places), occupancy rates are likely to stay high for as long 
as the current planning controls persist.
This, in turn, means that suppliers face little threat of 
displacement and have limited competitive pressures to 
be efficient. This localized market power is intensified 
because consumers seeking a place, especially in high care, 
are often doing so as a result of either a sharp deterioration 
in performance or the death of their spouse or caregiver: 
there is therefore an element of urgency in their search for 
a place. Moreover, they usually have strong preferences as 
to the location of the facility, and would incur a significant 
element of discomfort should they need to move from one 
facility to another. These features further increase the market 
power arising from rationing, and hence add to the blunting 
of pressures for efficiency.
The result is an industry structure which, while it does 
secure some important policy objectives (such as geographic 
equity of access), does not make the most efficient use of 
scarce resources.
As at June 30, 2006, some 1276 businesses/organizations 
(“approved providers”) were engaged in the provision of sub-
sidized residential aged care through 2929 outlets (“aged care 
homes”). There has been very little change in the number of 
aged care homes over recent years, although there has been 
some amalgamation of approved providers. The residential 
aged care industry continues to be highly disaggregated, with 
the average approved provider operating 2.3 aged care homes 
and 128.1 operational places in June 2006. Some 65% of pro-
viders operate only one home and 71% of providers operate 
less than 100 places. Many current providers seem too small 
to achieve economies of scale and scope. The restrictions on 
the number of places make it difficult for entrants to secure 
a sufficient number of beds in any locality for themselves 
and displace less efficient incumbents.
The consequence is persistent technical inefficiency. 
Professor Hogan estimated that in 2001–2002, the aver-
age technical inefficiency of the residential aged care 
industry, measured in terms of the difference between 
average practice and the technical efficiency frontier, was 
17%. It is questionable whether that gap has diminished 
significantly since then. Thus, industry returns continue 
to be highly variable. In 2004–2005, for example, the 
average net profit/loss per bed day varied from a loss of 
AU$7.31 (or a profit margin of -4.6% of revenue) in the 
lowest quartile of performance to a profit of AU$25.42 
(or a profit margin of +15.9% of revenue) in the highest 
quartile of performance.
As well as blunting the incentives for efficiency, consum-
ers’ limited abilities to exercise choice means that some form 
of price control is needed to prevent the abuse of localized 
market power. Reflecting this, most of the prices that can be 
charged by care providers are controlled by regulation.
As with all forms of price control, there is a risk of alloca-
tive inefficiency, as the limited number of places may not be 
allocated to those who value them most highly. Additionally, 
there is a longer-term risk that prices will not be allowed 
to reach levels that cover efficient costs, compromising the 
incentives to invest, at least in those locations with high 
costs of service. The inefficiency created by the rationing of 
places may then be accentuated by distortions to the pattern 
of investment, with places ultimately not being available 
when and where they are needed. The fact that the regulated 
prices are largely geographically uniform, despite some 
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variations in costs,28 makes the risk of inefficiencies all the 
greater. There is also the risk that the Commonwealth (as 
principal funder) may be paying above the level needed to 
cover efficient costs in some areas.
In short, the current arrangements, while relatively 
effective in likely providing for equitable access to aged-
care services, achieve that goal through a complex tangle of 
quantitative restrictions that impedes supply flexibility and 
limits competition. The lack of competition and the desire 
to limit the Commonwealth’s fiscal exposure then give rise 
to price controls, which though extensive are of very differ-
ing degrees of effectiveness. Consumers face restricted (and 
distorted) choices in terms of the range of care available, and 
charges that are often difficult to understand as a result of 
the interaction of complex prices with even more complex 
income and assets tests. Recent changes to policy do move 
broadly in the right direction in addressing these issues, but 
there remains a need for more comprehensive reform, which 
by its nature will take some years to devise and effect.
Above and beyond the efficiency issues we have already 
noted, it is questionable whether the current arrangements 
are fully sustainable. It is to the issue of the future financing 
of aged care that we now turn.
Providing for aged-care costs
Over the coming decades, funding aged care will place a 
growing burden on the community. Currently, 1.2% of Gross 
National Income (GNI) goes on the provision of residential 
aged care and community care packages. Under current poli-
cies, public and private expenditure on aged care will more 
than double to 2.9% of GNI by 2046–2047.29,30
At the moment, the bulk of aged-care funding is pro-
vided by the Commonwealth through consolidated revenue. 
Funding aged care in this way amounts to requiring current 
tax-payers, who are mainly in the labor force, to pay for the 
costs of caring for older Australians.
There is clearly a case based on social equity for the com-
munity to continue to fund the cost of long-term care for those 
older Australians who could not do so themselves. Moreover, 
the modern theory of efficient taxation suggests that under 
reasonable assumptions, a lower degree of inequality in 
incomes (or more generally, in living standards) is necessary 
or justifiable in the older population than among working-age 
income earners.31 In a “pay as you go” (PAYG) system, this 
redistribution occurs primarily through a shift in income from 
the working population to those who are retired.
The extent of the intergenerational wealth transfer this 
entails should not be exaggerated. An effect of  Commonwealth 
funding of aged care is to protect the bequests made by long-
term care recipients to their heirs. The exclusion of the family 
home from the asset tests used in determining eligibility for 
aged care subsidies is of central importance in this respect, as 
the family home is the primary asset most older Australians 
own and are in a position to pass on. As a result, the extent 
of the redistribution effected by the existing PAYG system 
depends on the degree to which the taxes used to cover cur-
rent aged costs are correlated with the bequests that are being 
preserved. As that correlation seems likely to be quite high, 
the system may cause fewer intergenerational transfers than 
commonly thought.
This also means that an increase in the degree of means-
testing of aged-care assistance may not be as favorable to 
current taxpayers, in terms of their lifetime income position, 
as superficially appears to be the case. In effect, the imme-
diate impact of increased means-testing is to induce more 
rapid asset decumulation among the elderly, which reduces 
expected bequests to the younger cohorts that currently bear 
the bulk of the tax burden. Additionally, greater means-
testing of aged-care assistance is effectively a tax on asset 
accumulation during working life. This can reduce the incen-
tive for life-time savings, as well as distorting accumulation 
choices towards assets that escape the means-testing. These 
impacts need to be set against any efficiency enhancement 
that means-testing (or increased means-testing) may allow 
in terms of immediate reductions in tax burdens and associ-
ated tax wedges. Increased means-testing, which implies an 
increase in the co-payment rate, may also reduce the extent 
of inefficient moral hazard. However, as noted above, moral 
hazard is unlikely to be significant, at least in the demand 
for high residential care.
These considerations have not prevented the contribution 
beneficiaries of care make to their aged care costs from ris-
ing significantly in recent years. Thus, while new entrants 
to high-level residential care paid approximately 21% of 
their residential care costs in 1995–1996 (the remainder 
being covered by payments from the Commonwealth), that 
proportion had risen to 29% in 2005–2006. New entrants to 
low-level residential care paid approximately 40% of their 
residential care costs in 1995–1996, and that proportion had 
risen to 57% in 2005–2006.
The financial burden aged-care costs can impose on older 
Australians is already material. For example, some 25% 
of female and male part-pensioners with total income of 
AU$30,000 per annum and assessable assets of AU$160,000 
who enter permanent residential low care will face an addi-
tional lifetime cost of more than AU$78,000 and AU$48,000 
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respectively (over and above the normal living costs they 
would have met if they had not entered residential aged care). 
Similarly, 25% of female and male self-funded retirees with 
total income of AU$60,000 per annum and assessable assets 
of AU$280,000 who enter permanent residential low care will 
face an additional lifetime cost of more than AU$153,000 and 
AU$94,000 respectively. If they choose to receive permanent 
residential care on an extra service basis, then 25% of women 
and men with this level of wealth will face an additional 
lifetime cost of more than AU$257,000 and AU$157,000 
respectively.3 These are clearly substantial amounts, even 
relative to average (much less median) wealth levels.
Despite those increases, it is likely that the Australian 
arrangements are still at the relatively redistributive end of 
the international spectrum, and that pressures for a further 
move to “user pays” will persist, regardless of which political 
party is in office.32
This is most obviously because the burden on taxpay-
ers and on the Commonwealth budget associated with the 
existing arrangements seems likely to increase sharply over 
time. Funding age-related pensions and aged care will cost 
Australia about 3.5% of GDP in 2009–2010 and is projected 
to increase to 5.7% of GDP by 2049–2050. The Intergenera-
tional Report 2010 projects that Commonwealth aged-care 
expenditure will increase from 0.8% of GDP, currently, 
to 1.8% of GDP by 2049–2050. This is lower in absolute 
terms than the projected increase in heath costs, from 4% 
of GDP to 7.1% of GDP, and on the age pension, which is 
projected to increase from 2.7% of GDP to 3.9% of GDP. 
However, the rate of growth in expenditure is the highest in 
aged care. The pressures to reduce this growth, and to see 
more of the cost borne by beneficiaries, are therefore likely 
to become progressively greater. This raises the question of 
whether a further increase in the co-payment rate is feasible, 
much less desirable.
Increasing the co-payment rate
An immediate constraint on placing a greater share of 
the cost of long-term care directly on beneficiaries is the 
income available to older Australians. Out of the popula-
tion of  Australians aged 80 or over, 72% of men and 83% 
of women have Government pensions and allowances as 
their main source of cash income. That said, many older 
Australians do have some access to additional cash funding. 
Thus, according to the ABS (2006), while 13% of all persons 
would be unable to raise AU$2000 in a week for something 
important, the proportion for those aged 65 and over living 
in couple-only households was 7.1% and for those aged 65 
and over living alone it was 12.7%.33 Moreover, although 
older Australians have significant assets, those assets are very 
unevenly distributed, despite the growth in superannuation 
holdings, and for most older Australians, consist mainly of 
the family home.34 Particularly for the very elderly, securing 
greater labor income is not an option, further limiting their 
ability to respond to adverse relative price increases (such 
as an increased co-payment rate for aged care).
It may be that markets would respond to an increased 
co-payment rate for aged care through the further develop-
ment of financial products that allow consumers to convert 
relatively illiquid assets into current income. Given the port-
folios typically held by older Australians, the most relevant 
product of this type is the reverse mortgage, by which home 
owners can secure a nonrecourse loan on which repayment 
only becomes due at the time the home is vacated. While 
reverse mortgages are becoming more widespread, there are 
some significant constraints on their potential.35
Reverse mortgages are a nonrecourse product, which 
means that the mortgagee bears the risk that the home, at 
the time of sale, is worth less than the outstanding amount 
of the loan. As a result, the mortgagee has some exposure to 
adverse selection by mortgagors who have a high expecta-
tion of prolonged tenancy in homes, who are in homes that 
are particularly vulnerable to price depreciation, or both. In 
practice, this adverse selection risk may not be all that great.36 
Of greater significance is the fact that the owner of a portfolio 
of reverse mortgages is exposed to correlated risk, arising 
from three features of reverse mortgages: since repayment 
is only made once the property is vacated, the amount of the 
loan increases over time, rather than decreasing as it does 
in a standard mortgage; the amount at risk therefore rises 
with longevity, but shocks (such as advances in medical 
technology) that increase longevity for one mortgagor may 
well increase it for all or many mortgagors; finally, given 
the nonrecourse nature of the loan, adverse trends in house 
prices, which cause negative equity on some loans, may 
deteriorate the value of significant sections of a mortgagee’s 
loan book.
This exposure of mortgagees to correlated risk natu-
rally limits the loan volumes they will make available, as 
well as increasing the cost of those loans. As a result, even 
though the reverse mortgage market seems set to continue 
growing rapidly (albeit off a low base), the degree to which 
older  Australians can access housing wealth without selling 
their home is likely to remain quite severely constrained. 
In addition, given that entry to residential aged care often 
occurs after 20 or more years of retirement, it is likely 
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that in many cases older people will have exhausted their 
reverse mortgages for retirement income prior to entry to 
residential care.
In short, though reverse mortgages and similar products may 
help recipients of aged care “unlock” some income streams, the 
extent of the likely impacts seem relatively small.
Another option would be to introduce a targeted element 
of pre-payment into the funding of aged care: that is, some 
mechanism by which future beneficiaries could set aside the 
amount needed to cover some or all of the care costs they 
were ultimately likely to incur. Potential beneficiaries would, 
in other words, be encouraged or required to save enough to 
help cover future aged care costs.
Raising this question is not to imply that there is neces-
sarily anything inherently undesirable in PAYG approaches. 
Thus, while current income earners might resent paying for 
the care costs of the elderly, the reality is that they too would 
at some point impose a cost on cohorts younger than their 
own. Moreover, if productivity is rising over time – as it 
historically has – then it is sensible not to “pre-save” today 
all that is needed to pay future care costs, as doing so would 
unnecessarily reduce current consumption.
However, the risk with PAYG approaches is that they can 
prevent sufficient savings from occurring now to allow future 
burdens to be met without an unjustifiably large sacrifice to 
consumption. In other words, just as we might “pre-save” 
too much, so the belief that future generations will pay for 
care costs might induce us to “pre-save” too little. This 
could be harmful, as it might induce future generations not 
to respect the commitment to pay for care costs, imposing 
unneeded harm on older Australians. Moreover, even were 
that commitment respected, doing so in a situation where too 
little had been set aside would unnecessarily harm the living 
standards of then current taxpayers (as high tax rates would 
be needed) as well as reducing national income through the 
disincentive effects of high taxation.37
The question then is whether some form of pre-payment 
for long-term care costs is feasible and what form such pre-
payment could most efficiently take.
Pre-paying long-term care
The risk of incurring long-term care costs is significantly, 
though not entirely, a function of longevity.38 The longer one 
lives, the greater the likelihood of needing aged care; and if 
one lives for much longer than one’s cohort, one is likely to 
need aged care for longer. Insurance for the cost of long-term 
care therefore involves a substantial element of insurance 
against longevity risk.
Traditionally, insurance against longevity risk was pro-
vided by defined benefit superannuation schemes. These 
schemes amounted to buying an annuity, which provided an 
income stream for life in retirement. The move from such 
defined benefit schemes to defined contribution schemes 
has, somewhat paradoxically, removed this form of longev-
ity insurance just as population aging makes longevity risk 
a matter of greater concern.
To some extent, the problems this could create are eased 
by the very fact that the spread of superannuation, even in its 
defined contribution form, means that ever more Australians 
will enter old age with some savings set aside. Those sav-
ings will provide a cushion that can be used to contribute to 
aged-care costs. However, the fact remains that in defined 
contribution schemes, it is superannuants that, unless they 
purchase annuities, are the bearers of longevity risk; more-
over, annuities (which would shift the longevity risk on to 
the issuer) generally have high loadings and low rates of 
voluntary take-up.39 It is of course possible for public policy 
to seek to incite greater annuitization – indeed, there are 
jurisdictions (such as the UK and Germany) where some 
degree of annuitization of retirement savings is mandatory. 
However, even if that were to occur, it seems unlikely that 
the amount of those annuities could realistically provide for 
long-term care costs – much less do so efficiently.40
The inefficiency of relying on annuitization of retirement 
savings to provide for long-term care costs arises from the 
fact that although use of long-term care will become more 
widespread, there will still be considerable unevenness 
in the distribution of long-term care use among the older 
population.
Thus, on best current estimates, almost half (49.9%) 
of women and a third (31.9%) of men aged 65 will enter 
permanent residential aged care at some time in their 
remaining life. Of those who do enter permanent residential 
aged care, women stay for 3.5 years, on average, while men 
stay for 2.3 years, on average. However, actual durations of 
care vary considerably. More specifically, some 36.0% of 
residents stay for less than 1 year (45.8% of men and 30.3% 
of women), with 17.1% of residents staying for less than 
3 months (22.6% of men and 13.8% of women). On the other 
hand, 21.3% of residents stay for at least 5 years (13.6% of 
men and 25.8% of women), and 4.6% of residents stay for 
at least 10 years (2.6% of men and 5.7% of women). These 
estimates are drawn from Cullen (2006, of at page 7).40 See 
also Cullen (2006).41
These variations in hazard rates imply considerable 
unevenness in the distribution of expected care costs within 
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the elderly population. Given that unevenness, a pure savings 
scheme would either result in savings that were inadequate 
to cover care costs (if most households saved less than the 
risk they were exposed to), or alternatively, if large numbers 
saved enough to cover potentially high exposures, the elderly 
would be forced to make larger bequests (and hence have 
lower lifetime consumption) than they desired.
Rather, it would seem more efficient to allow the risk to 
be pooled through some form of insurance targeted at long-
term care. The question, however, is the extent to which the 
risk of long-term care possesses the characteristics required 
for a risk to be insurable. Historically, it has not proved to 
be so in Australia; with the most recent attempt being aban-
doned in 1981, with the following comment from the then 
Health Minister:
Nursing home patients are, strictly speaking, uninsurable 
through voluntary insurance in which guaranteed benefits 
without discrimination or exclusion are made mandatory; 
and the arrangement represents an inequitable liability for 
the bulk of the people with hospital insurance … the gov-
ernment also believes that this measure will further assist 
in containing the cost of health insurance.42
Nevertheless, prima facie, there is no obvious reason why 
it should not be possible for private insurance markets to offer 
insurance against long-term care costs. Thus, the event that 
would be insured is definable: it is, in other words, possible to 
determine whether or not the event “a need for long term care” 
has indeed occurred, through assessment instruments that mea-
sure the extent of disability.43 Moreover, the losses associated 
with long-term care costs have a probabilistic character: while 
the likelihood of ever requiring long-term care is relatively 
high, the duration of that care, and hence its costs, varies greatly 
within the population, in ways that are amenable to statistical 
characterization. Finally, given annual long-term care costs of 
AU$50,000 or more, the severity of the event occurring should 
be high enough to induce risk-averse individuals to finance the 
loadings (associated with underwriting and other administrative 
costs) needed to make an insurance product viable.
Given these features, it is unsurprising that insurance 
products aimed at covering long-term care costs exist in a 
number of countries. (Indeed, as we have noted, such insur-
ance was part of the aged care arrangements in Australia in the 
period to 1981.) However, experience in Australia and over-
seas suggests that the widespread development and take-up 
of these products encounters substantial difficulties.44,45
First, there are many complexities involved in devising 
and properly pricing long-term care insurance products.
To begin with, the risks associated with the need for 
long-term care may not be independent, in the sense of being 
uncorrelated across the population. This is because the fac-
tors that increase longevity for any one member of a cohort 
(say, advances in medical technology), may also increase 
longevity both for other members of that cohort and for 
succeeding cohorts.46 This correlated risk limits the scope 
for intra- and intergenerational risk pooling and means that 
insurers would need higher reserves, which in turn implies 
that loadings would be higher (or exclusions and limitations 
greater), reducing demand.
Moreover, an insurance instrument for long-term care 
that was narrowly drawn – say, in only covering residential 
high care – would likely be inefficient, in that it would per-
petuate existing forms of care at the expense of innovation 
in care delivery (which could increase the relative efficiency 
of domiciliary care). However, an instrument that covered 
a wider range of forms of care could be materially exposed 
to adverse selection (that is, the danger that only those who 
are likely to need high payouts take out the policy, causing 
the insurer to bear net losses) and especially moral hazard 
(the risk that once insured, the holders of insurance will 
have every incentive to make use of any benefits the policy 
provides).
Finally, the need for long-term care is not merely a ques-
tion of health status but also of the availability of informal, 
and especially spousal, care. As a result, an efficient long-
term care insurance policy needs to condition not only on 
the insured’s health condition but also on his or her family 
circumstances. However, there is little experience with the 
design and actuarial assessment of these products and hence 
the risk and loadings they involve are likely to be high, espe-
cially in the initial phases.47
As a result, it remains to be seen whether the insurance 
industry is capable of generating products that provide rea-
sonable cover for care costs at affordable premiums.
Second, as well as these issues on the supply side, there 
are important demand side constraints on the development and 
widespread take-up of effective long-term care insurance.
The most obvious constraint on demand for care insur-
ance is the fact that the Commonwealth assures, and will 
continue to assure, access to a high quality safety net service 
through Commonwealth funding of aged care (essentially 
a publicly funded insurance arrangement). While this has 
obvious benefits in terms of equity of access, protecting the 
dignity of older Australians, and more widely social cohesion, 
it inevitably reduces the incentives for individuals to make 
provision for themselves.
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2011:4 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
77
Providing and financing aged care in Australia
The scope for “extra service” may partially offset this 
disincentive effect. However, in a means-tested scheme, it 
will likely remain the case that any payments made for that 
service will be offset against the Commonwealth subsidy. 
This reduces the net benefit to the insured, as the “cost” to the 
insured of the extra care is the sum of the direct cost of that 
care (reflected in the insurance premiums, along with a load-
ing) and the foregone subsidy. As a result, even in a system 
where “extra service” options are available, some “crowding 
out” effect will persist.
Even putting this “crowding out” effect aside, demand 
may also be affected by complex behavioral factors.
To begin with, although it is not clear how much weight 
should be placed on this, potential insureds may be reluctant 
to purchase insurance if this makes it more likely that their 
children will place them in long-term care (or limit their 
supply of informal care) in circumstances where they would 
otherwise choose not to.48 Moreover, given the cost of long-
term care, it is not realistic to expect those currently close to 
or in retirement to obtain a high degree of insurance cover-
age against long-term care costs: the premiums they would 
have to pay would be so high as to make obtaining insurance 
unattractive, if not unaffordable. This is both because they 
would need to accumulate a claim in a relatively short space 
of time and because, having made it to retirement, they are 
more likely than the population overall to make it to the age 
at which there is very high demand for long-term care.47
Rather, long-term care insurance is most likely to be afford-
able for younger consumers, who could accumulate a claim 
over a lifetime and in any event form a more diverse risk pool. 
However, those younger consumers are unlikely to be concerned 
much about long-term care. Rather, there is considerable 
evidence that consumers underestimate the potential value of 
income claims that are in the relatively distant future, claims 
that they may discount at hyperbolic rates.49 The fact that those 
consumers would need to pay insurance loadings for many years 
before claiming would likely reduce the attractiveness of these 
insurance products even further. And even if those consumers 
are concerned with health costs in old age, they may not want 
to split up their savings into smaller buckets (including one 
dedicated to aged care costs), as each such bucket involves some 
transaction costs and loss of diversification benefits.50
As a result, it is not apparent that voluntary demand for 
long-term care insurance would be sufficient to make this an 
attractive market for insurers.47
Third and last, a move to a situation in which a greater 
share of long-term care costs was covered by pre-payment 
would involve complex transition issues.
As noted above, those potential users who are at mate-
rial risk of needing long-term care in the very near future 
are likely to be effectively uninsurable. As a result, their 
costs will have to be largely covered under current PAYG 
arrangements and hence will fall mainly on the working 
age population. However, that population would at the same 
time need to start accumulating the claims on whatever pre-
payment instruments we are going to fund (or contribute to 
funding) their eventual use of aged care. As a result, in the 
transitional phase, the working-age population would face a 
“double whammy”, whose incidence would depend on the 
speed with which any such transition was being made.
Of course, greater longevity may itself ease this problem, 
as it implies that there is a longer period of time separating 
the current working-age population from entry into aged care. 
Nonetheless, the need to manage a period in which there is 
both a tax burden and a pre-saving burden on the working-
age population may affect the rate at which any transition to 
a different funding model occurs.
In short, experience to date is not encouraging as regards 
the development of efficient, voluntary forms of pre-payment 
for long-term care. Superannuation alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient, at least in the relatively near term, for the vast 
majority of Australians. Annuities might provide a means 
of procuring some additional coverage against longevity 
risk, but the market for suitable annuity products is not well 
developed. Moreover, seeking to cover the risk associated 
with long-term care costs through annuities alone would 
likely imply an inefficiently high-level of bequests. Finally, 
the most direct form of cover – long-term care insurance – 
has not proved effective, at least in jurisdictions where it has 
been available on a voluntary basis.
This is not to deny or overlook the inventiveness of finan-
cial markets and the incentives participants in these markets 
have to develop instruments that could help individuals meet 
long-term care costs. Providers of long-term care may also 
have incentives to assist in the development and commercial-
ization of relevant savings products.  Moreover, it may be that 
these products could be constructed out of combining existing 
products – for example, through annuities that provide addi-
tional income on the occurrence of defined events. However, 
even accepting each of these points, the fact remains that 
there is a substantial “chicken and egg” element to the cur-
rent equilibrium: comprehensive,  Commonwealth-funded, 
coverage reduces the incentives to save for future care costs; 
this means that markets for most of the potentially relevant 
products are thin, accentuating adverse selection risks and 
in any event compromising the ability to achieve scale 
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economies; this is reflected in a cost penalty which further 
reduces demand; with the result that very few long-term 
care beneficiaries are covered by these products, making it 
politically and socially difficult to increase the co-payment 
rate, even in a phased manner.
Going forward
Internationally there would appear to be a general consen-
sus that the aging of the population will drive the need for 
reform in long-term care.51 Any reform of long-term care in 
the Australian context needs to balance the needs of social 
policy – for example, ensuring equity of access, including in 
geographic regions not normally amenable to market forces, 
and addressing the information asymmetries inherent in 
health markets and especially prevalent in the long-term care 
market – with those of fiscal policy, while providing greater 
scope for competition, service differentiation, and innovation 
than current arrangements permit.
While reform can help ensure aged care provides “good 
value” to consumers, the reality is that younger Australians 
face a future in which they will have to provide a potentially 
rising share of aged-care costs. If it is a goal of policy to 
prevent future tax rates on income earners from having to 
rise substantially, some savings would need to be set aside 
now to fund future aged-care costs.
Some of that savings can be done through Government 
running a budget surplus. However, there could be efficiency 
gains if individual consumers can provide for themselves, be 
it by accumulating the assets required to self-insure against 
long-term care costs or by purchasing financial products 
that supply that insurance. The extent and limits of those 
efficiencies are discussed in Lindbeck and Persson (2003).52 
Moreover, a move in that direction seems consistent with a 
general approach of encouraging individuals and families 
to take a responsible approach to the future and thus be able 
to exercise greater control over, and choice in, the aged-care 
services they consume. Additionally, greater private sector 
involvement – including through insurers covering care 
costs – could make for innovative approaches to care provi-
sion and for better monitoring of care providers, as private 
health insurers are now beginning to do in respect of hospitals 
and of chronic disease.
Policy recommendations
Although the Australian aged care system performs well in 
terms of the quality and scope of service provision, govern-
ments will need to face important issues about the system’s 
financial sustainability and efficiency as population aging 
progresses. Our policy recommendations can be summarized 
as follows:
1. Governance and regulation. Many of the distortions in 
the current aged care system arise from attempts by the 
Commonwealth to manage its fiscal risk. For instance, 
means tests and regulations discriminate for and against 
care recipients in the access to necessary aged-care ser-
vices and accommodation. Under the current arrangement, 
the Government is the price setter, price taker, and price 
controller, with complex regulation and controls to protect 
its interests (eg, fiscal exposure). Such rigid and inflex-
ible structure exists in a changing environment in which 
higher and more complex levels of care will be required 
by many. A governance and regulatory setting recognizing 
the centrality of choice by care recipients is auspicial and 
preferable over the current one-size-fits-all model.
2. Pricing. An independent authority or commission needs 
to be established to ensure a suitable pricing mechanism. 
In particular, its functions would be to determine an 
appropriate economic cost of aged-care services and of 
levels of supplementary (eg, hotel) and accommodation 
services, and also to provide evaluation, calculation 
and administration of this cost mechanism. In sum, the 
independent authority will serve as the sole price setter, 
enabling Government to focus on determining the level 
of services funded and provided, and purchasing.
3. Funding. A number of concurrent options can be consid-
ered for the financing of aged care. Under the current PAYG 
system, the Commonwealth efforts to manage its fiscal 
exposure have created serious distortions to the aged-care 
market and have imposed substantial risk on consum-
ers. As expenditure pressures increase, it is very likely 
that all current problems will be aggravated if the status 
quo persists. A proposed alternative to the PAYG system 
involves voluntary tax-assisted savings accounts, dedicated 
to aged-care and health expenditures.  Consumers would 
have a capped level of outlays, and outlays above the cap 
would be covered by the  Commonwealth. This means that 
the Government would retain funding responsibility for all 
those out of the scheme and for the outlays above the cap. 
Such a scheme is vulnerable to adverse selection, the extent 
of which would depend on the extent of tax preferences, but 
it is not clear how these preferences could be set efficiently. 
In practice, this scheme is likely to further distort the taxa-
tion of savings. Savings accounts can provide incentives to 
limit consumers’ moral hazard. However the same outcome 
can be obtained through co-insurance in an alternative 
mandatory insurance arrangement (see next page). Finally, 
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if the level of savings is set low, the scheme is likely to have 
little effect, and if high might leave individuals with excess 
bequests. A promising alternative to the two previous 
proposals is to introduce a designed universal competitive 
mandatory insurance scheme. A competitive setting can 
promote greater responsiveness to consumer needs and 
greater efficiency in contracting with consumers and care 
providers. In addition, competition may be less likely than 
a public monopoly to engage in rationing as consumers can 
shift insurer. The achievement of efficiency and equity in 
the context of a competitive mandatory insurance scheme 
is highly influenced by the regulatory context. A poorly 
designed regulatory framework can create, for example, 
strong incentives for selection. In this respect, the efficacy 
of risk equalization and hence the structure of cross-
subsidies is crucial, if supported by a suitably designed 
regulatory framework.
As a result, the provision and financing of aged care is 
likely to become an ever greater area of policy attention in 
the years ahead.
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